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Introduction
by GEORGE W. MITCHELL*

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act' resulted from the work of the
National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers. 2 The Commission's Final Report 3 was filed October 28, 1977; the EFT Act was enacted November 10, 1978. The Commission's findings dealt with
several aspects of the electronic transfer of deposits, principally: (1)
the probable impact on consumers in making or receiving payments;
(2) the regulatory responsibility and participation by government
and the Federal Reserve in assuring accessible, efficient and reliable
electronic services; (3) the role of banks and other depository institutions in offering such services on a competitive or cooperative basis; and (4) the ready availability of technological innovations to
public and private offerors of electronic transfer services.
The Commission made over one hundred separate recommendations 4-- most of them advisory, exhortatory or admonitory. Its legislative recommendations were intended mainly to identify and
establish consumer rights and liabilities. To some degree, the Commission incorporated the rules for the payment of checks set forth
in the Uniform Commercial Code as ground rules for EFT. In its
recommendations for statutory changes, the Commission generally
did not attempt to determine whether state or federal legislation
was more appropriate, and this was its position on consumer-interest items.5 However, at the Congressional hearings held to review
the Final Report, some witnesses recommended that the U.C.C. be
* Vice-chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1973-76; member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System and Federal Open Market Committee, 1967-76; Federal Reserve System member, National Commission on Electronic
Fund Transfers to the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-93r (1978) [hereinafter cited as EFT Act].
2. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2401 et seq. (1976).
3. NAT'L COMM'N ON ELEC. FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1977) (final report) [hereinafter cited
as FINAL REPORT).

4. Id.
5. See, e.g., id. at 68-71.
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extended to cover electronic transfers, rather than passing a federal
EFT law that would preempt state laws and regulations. 6 In the
end, Congress chose to provide a basic level of consumer protection
states to enact more protective
at the federal level, and allow the
7
legislation if they felt it desirable.
The act that Congress adopted endorsed EFT as having the potential for substantial benefits to consumers, 8 but did not indicate
what EFT had in store for the depository institutions that were expected to offer electronic transfer to their customers. This is a major
industry problem, as EFT is no small thing for commercial banking.
The industry as a whole cannot take it or leave it. Electronic transfer is unquestionably the most efficient way-resource cost, energy
and time-wise--of making deposit transfers today, and the decision
on how to shift from paper to electronics cannot safely be deferred
to the next generation of banking chief executive officers.
The change-over involves a number of investment and management decisions for the industry because, over time, electronic transfer will drastically reduce the need for branch offices, tellers, vaults
and related facilities. Moreover, as paper checks and cash are displaced, the transportation of the evidence of payment will be shifted
to electronic communications and away from the surface and air
couriers and the Postal Service now used for paper instruments.
The bundle of money services long offered by commercial banks
has been the cornerstone of banking around the world. Today, the de
facto monopoly that commercial banks have on such services is being eroded both by other depository institutions and by such innovators as credit card companies using widely available technological
expertise in communication and data processing. Such innovators
are perfectly capable of carrying off the cornerstones of commercial
banking unless commercial bankers match such expertise in their
own operations.
Can commercial banking afford to give up money transfer service? Today, net demand deposits are less than twenty percent of
commercial bank assets, compared to fifty-four percent in 1955. 9
Will that trend continue? Will it be aborted by automatic transfer
between demand and savings accounts? Commercial banks cannot
6. Consumer Protection Aspects of EFT Systems. HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (1978) (response of Professor H. Scott).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1693q (1978).
8. Id. § 1693a.
9. Figures for the current year are shown in FED. RESERVE BULL., Sept. 1979, at
A18 (table 1.26). Figures for 1955 are shown in FED. RESERVE BD., BANKING & MONETARY STATISTICS, 1941-1970, at 28 (table 1.3).
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afford to give up money service because of its linkage to other funds
sources and to the merchandising of profitable, consumer financial
services. Savings and cooperative banks in Europe learned long ago
that money transfer service is vital to serving their consumer customers. Their counterparts in the United States are coming to the
same conclusion.
The operational essence of money transfer--data processing,
storage, and communications-lies in one of the few areas where operating costs continue to decline dramatically as a consequence of
technological advances. Banks have already embraced electronic
processing and storage, but still sort and return checks to customers, keep facsimilies and, as an industry, have not encouraged their
customers, through comparative pricing, to initiate their money receipts and disbursements electronically. Customers' transactions
are still handled as if the written check were not only the best, but
the only, way of effecting a deposit transfer. The check, an instrument devised to expedite payment, has become a contrivance used
by some persons to defer payment. Today, from a technological
standpoint, the check is functionally obsolete; it is part of the firstclass mail service generation, which a recent study found depended
communications for eighty percent of its volon financially-related
10
ume.
In most European countries, income payments (wage, salaries,
social security, etc.) do not involve checks, but have been for some
time directly credited to the recipients' account in one or another
type of financial institution. Today, magnetic tape is used to save
three-quarters to four-fifths of the transaction costs of paper transfers. Additional savings are possible as direct communication between computers via wire or satellite displaces all paper and nonlocal magnetic tape movement.
Assuming that money services are vital to commercial banking,
electronic fund transfers, by exploiting data processing and communications technology, become the catalyst for an orderly transition
away from paper-based systems. How this comes about depends on
competition and regulation.
If there were no competition to commercial banking from other
depository institutions, credit cards, mutual funds, and professionals
in data processing and communication, EFT technology might safely
be ignored. Apart from the attrition caused by steadily rising transaction costs, and the cyclical fluctuation in interest rates causing
10. Recommendations of the Commission on Postal Services: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Postal Operationsand Services of the House Comm on Post Office and
Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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more and higher fees for money services, the public could be served
as in the past. This, however, is the very environment that those
equipped to utilize decreasing cost technology can exploit. It is not
difficult to conceive of a money service that is only marginally based
on the existence of deposit accounts; indeed, it is being offered today by mutual funds and certain debit cards. While banking
flounders in its own paper inheritance, institutions in that "outer
financial space"--thrifts, mutual funds, and innovative enterprises
in other guises--electronically chip away at banking's cornerstone.
Will banking be protected by regulation against the threat of
competitive suppliers of money services? It seems not. While one
function of regulation historically has been to protect depository institutions from the ravages of competition in the interest of continued institutional viability, recent trends have been toward
enhancing competition among banks and from other depository institutions. Today, consumer protection legislation and implementing regulations have become broad-based and pervasive. Though
competition is widely recognized as a major safeguard protecting
consumers from predatory business practices, regulation also has an
essential role. Even when consumers can see, feel, or otherwise
sense a product or service being purchased on the spot, their interests still demand the protection provided by honest labeling and
open pricing regulations. The same is true in the banking industry.
Banking has always been a personal business where terms,
prices, liabilities, and perquisites commonly have been variableusually in relationship to the value of a particular customer's business. Frequently, terms are unspecified in advance and unknown by
customers. Correcting uncertainties of this type is the most significant step that can be taken to remove exposure to regulatory costs
and burdens.
What is the cost of regulation? Who pays for it? Does it become
an overhead cost element leading to higher prices, or do regulatory
aggravations lead to the withdrawal of services from the market? Do
regulations which serve the interests of a very small fraction of the
population warrant the burden placed on everyone else? Questions
of this type need to be addressed, even though specific answers are
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
In a $2.25 trillion economy, a few billions of dollars in regulatory
friction and cost is barely visible. That fact, however, does not justify marginal expenditures, nor is it persuasive to the businesses or
consumers who perceive and measure their costs and benefits arising from a specific regulation.
Both users and providers of EFT services can gain from effec-
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tive regulation, if they agree on cost-effective measures to establish
their respective rights and liabilities. Consumers will also gain from
precise knowledge of the character of services offered and their
price in terms of balances, fees and availability. The present payment system is not cost effective, because user behavior is not
guided by prices toward more efficient payment practices. Costs are
little used in pricing because they are widely and haphazardly dispersed among payors, payees, depository institutions and public
agencies. Many costs are unknown though knowable. Others are
obscurely "joint" or lost in "overheads." "Bundling" is pervasive. As
there are two sides to every transaction, how should the cost be split
between the payor and payee--charging both, sometimes one, sometimes the other or, ostensibly, neither? When labor was cheap, energy plentiful and competition in payment services controlled, these
questions were de minimus; however, with paper transaction costs
at fifty cents per item and rising," while cheaper electronic alternatives are available, economics should be allowed to play a larger
role. Pricing money transfer services at full cost will encourage the
conservation of resources and the exercise of consumer preferences.
Section 914 of the EFT Act 12 specifically states that the Act does
not prohibit private agreements between a bank and consumer that
provide the consumer with more advantageous terms. The Act thus
encourages the development of superior banking practices by providing that the statute gives way to transaction terms that offer consumers more extensive rights or greater protections. As admirable
as the statutory standards of the Act may be, it should not be difficult for a depository institution to better many of them. Such a view
of the Act-not as a high water mark, but a low water mark in consumer and institutional relationships-would be a most constructive
approach in perusing the contributions to this issue of the Computer/Law Journal.

11. G. Mitchell, Technology and Banking (speech given in Zurich, Switzerland, on
Oct. 9, 1979).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 16931 (1978).

